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Abstract
Provision of GNSS Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) in Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) architectures has the potential to provide an
integrity-augmented SAA solution suitable for cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios
where GNSS is used as the primary source of navigation and/or surveillance data (e.g,
employing ADS-B). In this paper, we evaluate the opportunities offered by this integration,
proposing a novel architecture that maximizes the synergies between ABIA and SAA
functionalities in UAV applications. The performance of this Integrity-Augmented SAA
(IAS) architecture was evaluated by simulating manned/unmanned platforms with different
dynamics in representative cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The numerical results
demonstrate that the proposed IAS architecture is capable of performing high-integrity
conflict detection and resolution when GNSS is used as the primary source of navigation
and/or surveillance data.
Keywords: Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation, Unmanned Aircraft, Sense-and-Avoid,
Obstacle Detection, Obstacle Avoidance and Global Navigation Satellite System.
Introduction
In safety-critical air navigation tasks (e.g., precision approach and landing flight phases) there
is a need to improve the integrity, continuity, availability and accuracy of Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) data to satisfy the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for these
flight phases. In parallel, GNSS data and system enhancements are required to meet the
requirements of mission-critical tasks (e.g., to improve air transport efficiency and
environmental sustainability) set by large-scale Air Traffic Management (ATM) programmes
including the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen). Inherent errors of the GNSS system, which affect all RNP
elements, are primarily due to satellite and receiver clock errors, ephemeris calculation and
atmospheric transmission errors. These inaccuracies, degradations and loss of data can be
mitigated by using various techniques including Differential GNSS (DGNSS), Space Based
Augmentation Systems (SBAS), and Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and
Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS). In ABAS architectures, the additional on-
board avionic systems operate via separate principles than the GNSS and, therefore, are not
subject to the same sources of error or interference. While GBAS and SBAS address all four
cornerstones of GNSS performance augmentation (i.e., accuracy, integrity, availability and
continuity), the ABAS approach is particularly well suited to increase the levels of integrity
and accuracy of GNSS in a variety of mission- and safety-critical aviation applications. In
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) applications, airworthiness drivers for both cooperative
and non-cooperative Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) impose stringent GNSS data integrity
requirements. Therefore, a properly designed and certifiable Avionics Based Integrity
Augmentation (ABIA) capability would allow an extended spectrum of autonomous and
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safety-critical operations by continuously monitoring GNSS integrity levels and providing
suitable caution and warning signals to the remote pilot or to the avionics flight control
systems in order to accomplish GNSS-based mission and safety-critical tasks. This increased
level of integrity could provide a pathway to support the challenging task of UAS certification
for unrestricted access to commercial airspace. Although current and likely future
SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can provide significant improvement of GNSS
navigation performance, a properly designed and flight certified ABIA system could play a
key role in GNSS integrity augmentation for aviation safety-critical applications, including
UAS SAA. Additionally, using suitable data link and data processing technologies on the
ground, a certified ABIA capability could be one of the core elements of a future GNSS
Space-Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN).
ABIA System
Research activities performed previously on ABIA systems demonstrated the potential of this
technology to enhance GNSS integrity performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
applications including experimental flight test/flight inspection, precision approach and
automatic landing [1-5]. Based on these results, an advanced ABIA system was developed for
UAS applications (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: ABIA system architecture for UAS applications
In this system, the on-board sensors provide information on the aircraft relevant flight
parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which
is also connected to the GNSS system. Using the available data on GNSS and the relevant
aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals are generated which can be sent to the UAV
Ground Control Station (GCS) and/or used by a Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM).
This system addresses both the predictive and reactive nature of GNSS integrity augmentation
by producing suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in case of predicted/ascertained
GNSS data losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding the RNP specified for each
phase of flight, and providing guidance information to the remote pilot/autopilot to avoid
further data losses and degradations. The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) are
applicable to the ABIA system [1]:
• ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time allowed for the caution flag to be
provided to the user before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition.
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• ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time allowed from the moment a
GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the moment that the ABIA
system provides a warning flag to the user.
An Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) module produces the following integrity flags [1-3]:
• Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation that the GNSS data delivered
to the avionics system is going to exceed the RNP thresholds specified for the current
and planned flight operational tasks (GNSS alert status).
• Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to
the avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds specified for the current flight
operational task (GNSS fault status).
ABIA Integrity Flag Generator
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of the IFG module and its interfaces.
Fig. 2: ABIA IFG module architecture
• The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal losses in aviation applications
were deeply analysed in [1] and are listed below:
• Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the wings, fuselage and empennage
during maneuvers);
• Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP);
• Fading, resulting in reduced carrier-to-noise ratios (low C/N0);
• Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and acquisition/reacquisition time;
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• Multipath effects, leading to a reduced C/N0 and to range/phase errors;
• Jamming and interference.
The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF and WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in
accordance with the specified TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant flight phases) [1-5].
The GNSS and Sensors Layer (GSL) passes the aircraft Position, Velocity, Time (PVT) and
attitude (Euler angles) data (from the on board Inertial Navigation Systems, Air Data
Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw measurements and PVT) and the Flight Control System
(FCS) actuators data to the Data Extraction Layer (DEL). At this stage, the required
Navigation and Flight Dynamics (NFD) and GNSS Constellation Data (GCD) are extracted,
together with the relevant information from an aircraft Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and
from a Terrain and Objects Database (TOD). The 3DM database is a detailed geometric model
of the aircraft built in a Computer Aided Three-dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA).
The TOD uses a Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) and additional man-made objects
data to obtain a detailed map of the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft. In the Integrity
Processing Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis Module (DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by
processing the NFD and GCD inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) processes the
3DM, TOD, GNSS Constellation Module (GCM) and A/C Navigation/Dynamics Module
(ADM) inputs to determine multipath contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) and
from the terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM)
receives inputs from the 3DM, GSCS and ADS, and computes the GNSS antenna obscuration
matrixes corresponding to the various aircraft manoeuvres [6]. The Signal Analysis Module
(SAM) calculates the C/N0 of the direct GNSS signals received by the aircraft in the presence
of atmospheric propagation disturbances, as well as the applicable radio frequency
interference and Jamming-to-Signal ratio (J/S) levels. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a
set of predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both caution and
warning flags associated with antenna obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier,
interference and satellite geometry degradations. The criteria for satellite-aircraft relative
geometry are [1]:
• When the current A/C manoeuvre will lead to less the 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall
be generated.
• When only 4 satellites are in view and one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less
than 10 degrees, the CIF shall be generated.
• When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be generated.
• When only 4 satellites are in view and one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less
than 5 degrees, the WIF shall be generated.
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP), GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [7]:
σ୔ = DOP × σ୙୉ୖ୉ (1)
where σ୔is the standard deviation of the positioning accuracy and σ୙୉ୖ୉ is the standard
deviation of the satellite pseudorange measurement error. Therefore, the 1-sigma Estimated
Position, Horizontal and Vertical Errors of a GNSS receiver can be calculated using the PDOP
(i.e., Estimated Position Error (EPE) in 3D), the HDOP (i.e., Estimated Horizontal Error
(EHE) in 2D) or the VDOP (i.e., Estimated Vertical Error (EVE)). The criteria for positioning
errors are [1, 7]:
• When the Estimated Horizontal Error (EHE) exceeds the required horizontal accuracy
95% or the Estimated Vertical Error (EVE) exceeds the required vertical accuracy
95% alert requirements, the CIF shall be generated.
• LAAS assisted GLS approach:
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- When the Predicted Lateral Protection Level (PLPL) exceeds Lateral Alert Limit
(LAL) or the Predicted Vertical Protection Limit (PVPL) exceeds the Vertical Alert
Limit (VAL), the CIF shall be generated.
- When the Lateral Protection Level (LPL) exceeds the LAL or the Vertical
Protection Level (VPL) exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
• When the EHE exceeds the LAL or the EVE exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be
generated.
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System (GLS) has to be augmented by GBAS in
order to achieve the RNP, as well as Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels (LPL and VPL).
LPL/VPL is defined as the statistical error value that bounds the Lateral/Vertical Navigation
System Error (NSE) with a specified level of confidence. In particular, for the case of Local
Area Augmentation System (LAAS), which allows for multiple Differential Global
Positioning System (DGPS) reference receivers (up to 4) to be implemented, 2 different
hypotheses are formulated regarding the presence of errors in the measurements:
• H0 Hypothesis: No faults are present in the range measurements (includes both the
signal and the receiver measurements) used in the ground station to compute the
differential corrections;
• H1 Hypothesis: A fault is present in one or more range measurements and is caused by
one of the reference receivers used in the ground station.
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as follows:LPL = Max {LPLୌ଴, LPLୌଵ} (2)VPL = Max {VPLୌ଴, VPLୌଵ} (3)
The criteria for radio frequency link thresholds are:
• Multipath:
- When the Early-Late-Phase (ELP) exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution flag for
multipath shall be generated [8, 9].
- When the multipath ranging error shows a sudden increase with the aircraft flying
in proximity of the ground (below 448.5 metres), the warning integrity flag shall be
generated.
- When the multipath ranging error exceeds 2 metres and the aircraft flies in
proximity of the ground (below 500 ft AGL), the warning integrity flag shall be
generated.
• Doppler:
- When the C/N0 is below 28 dB-Hz and the signal is lost, the caution integrity flag
for Doppler shall be generated if the estimated acquisition time is less than the
application-specific TTA requirements.
- When the C/N0 is below 28 dB-Hz and the signal is lost, the warning integrity flag
for Doppler shall be generated if the estimated acquisition time exceeds the
application-specific TTA requirements.
The criteria for receiver tracking thresholds are:
• When the signal tracking errors are within 5% of the maximum error budget tolerated
by the receiver [7, 10, 11, 12], the CIF shall be generated.
• When the signal tracking loss conditions occur [7, 10, 11, 12], the WIF shall be
generated.
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• When the C/N0 is less than 27 dB-Hz or the difference between the S/N and the
processing gain is less than 12 dB, the CIF shall be generated.
• When the C/N0 is less than 25 dB-Hz or the difference between the S/N and the
processing gain is less than 10 dB, the WIF shall be generated.
• When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds the VAL, the CIF shall be generated.
• When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be
generated.
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-Late Phase (ELP) observable and the
range error [13]. The multipath integrity flags criteria are the following:
• When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution integrity flag shall be generated.
• When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter, the warning integrity flag shall be
generated.
The integrity flag criteria for SBAS are the following [13]:
• When VPLSBAS exceeds VAL or HPLSBAS exceeds HAL, the WIF shall be generated.
• When number of satellites in view is less than 7 or 8 which depends on bank angle, the
CIF shall be generated.
• When number of satellites in view is less than 4, the WIF shall be generated.
The integrity flag criteria for GBAS are the following:
• When the PLPLGBAS exceeds LAL or PVPLGBAS exceeds the VAL, the CIF shall be
generated.
• When the LPLGBAS exceeds the LAL or the VPLGBAS exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall
be generated.
• When number of satellites in view is less than 5, the CIF shall be generated.
• When number of satellites in view is less than 4, the WIF shall be generated.
The ABIA system monitors the GNSS performances and gathers appropriate data to detect a
departure from the nominal service state. The system reports any detected abnormal behaviour
to the pilot/autopilot for action (i.e., either modify the aircraft trajectory or terminate the
GNSS service). These functions are performed in a sequential manner and each function is
modelled as a time-to-complete process. The cumulative sum of all four function completion
times defines the time required for their associated integrity assurance process to respond to a
navigation service failure. The response model provides the overall time-to-complete by
considering the times required for monitoring, detecting, reporting and reacting (i.e.,
computing and commanding an optimised trajectory free from GNSS data degradations) and
is given by [1, 14]:
Δt୰ୣ ୱ୮୭୬ୢ = Δt୫ ୭୬୧୲୭୰+ Δtୢ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲+ Δt୰ୣ ୮୭୰୲+ Δt୰ୣ ୟୡ୲ (4)
ABIA/SAA Integration
The ABIA/SAA integrated architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3. The Position, Velocity and
Attitude (PVA) measurements are obtained from an integrated Navigation and Guidance
System (NGS) that utilises an Extended/Unscented Kalman Filter (EKF/UKF) to augment
information from GNSS and other navigation sensors including Inertial Navigation System
(INS), vision based sensors and Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) as a virtual sensor [15].
Based on availability, either cooperative SAA (C-SAA) or non-cooperative SAA (N-SAA)
sensors are used for granting safe separation. In parallel, the ABIA flight path optimization
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process starts when the CIF is generated. Differential Geometry (DG) or Pseudospectral (PS)
optimisations techniques are used to generate a set of optimal trajectory solutions free of near
mid-air conflicts and integrity degradations. The selection of PSO or DGO is based on the
available time horizons for the ABIA and SAA processes. The time to conflict is compared
with that of the time taken for the optimisation and maneuver execution processes. The
Frenet-Serret equations are used to describe host UAV/intruder relative motion [16] and a
minimum separation distance is defined taking into account the combined navigation/tracking
uncertainty volume. If the distance between the UAV and the moving intruder is or will be
less than the separation distance at a specific time interval, then a conflict condition is
established. Time and fuel are used as criteria in the cost functional (applying different
weightings to obtain a set of feasible solutions), the dynamic model is used as the dynamic
constraint, and satellite elevation criteria are used as path constraints.
Fig. 3: ABIA/SAA integrated architecture.
The selection of the optimal trajectory from the generated set of safe trajectories is performed
is based on minimisation of the following cost function [17, 18]:J = w୲ ∙ tୗ୅୊୉ + w୤∫[SFC ∙ T(t)]dt −wୢ ∙ D୫ ୧୬− w୧ୢ ∙ ∫D(t)dt (5)
where D(t) is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance trajectory points from the
avoidance volume associated with the obstacle, D୫ ୧୬ = min[D(t)] is the estimated minimum
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume, tୗ୅୊୉ = t|ୈౣ ౟౤ is the time at
which the safe avoidance condition is successfully attained, SFC [୩୥
୒
∙ s] is the specific fuel
consumption, T(t) is the thrust profile, {w୲ , w୤, wୢ, w୧ୢ } are the weightings attributed to
time, fuel, distance and integral distance respectively. In time-critical avoidance applications
(i.e., closing-up obstacles with high relative velocities) appropriate higher weightings are used
for the time and distance cost elements. The False Alarm Rate (FAR) is obtained by
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considering the cases where no WIF is generated following the raise of a CIF. The FAR is
given by: FAR = ୘୭୲ୟ୪୊ୟ୪ୱୣ ୟ୪ୟ୰୫ ୱ
୘୭୲ୟ୪ୢ ୳୰ୟ୲୧୭୬୭୤ୱ୧୫ ୳୪ୟ୲୧୭୬
(6)
The Detection Rate (DR) is obtained as (1-FAR).
Simulation Cases
A number of simulation case studies were performed to evaluate the performance of the ABIA
and integrated ABIA/SAA systems. A GNSS Constellation Simulator (GSCS) was developed
to calculate GNSS satellite position and velocity in the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
reference frame and to obtain satellite visibility data from any point along the aircraft flight
trajectory. The GSCS was implemented in MATLAB® to simulate both GPS and GALILEO
constellations. The satellite position and velocity were calculated from the Kepler's laws of
orbital motion using either the YUMA or SEM almanac data [19, 20] for GPS and a standard
Walker constellation (27/3/1), which means 27 satellites in three Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)
planes with 1 active spare satellite per orbital plane. The selected ABIA/SAA host platform
was the AEROSONDE UAV and various geometric parameters were extracted from the
literature to draw a detailed 3-D model of this aircraft [21-23]. The integration of ABIA into
an existing UAV SAA architecture was studied in various C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios. In
all test cases, an avoidance volume (sum of navigation and tracking errors) was generated by
the SAA system [17]. PS or DG optimisation techniques were used to generate the new
(optimal) trajectory based on the available time to conflict (i.e., host entering the avoidance
volume). The avoidance trajectory was initiated by the SAA system when the probability of
collision exceeded the required threshold value. Time, fuel, distance and integral distance
were used in the cost functional, the UAV 3-DOF dynamic model was used as dynamic
constraint, and the minimum elevation criteria as path constraint for both optimisation
techniques. Boundary conditions were set from the values of the flight parameters at the first
CIF epoch. Fig. 4 illustrates the C-SAA test scenario where three AEROSONDE UAVs (1
ABIA host platform and 1 intruder) are on a head-on collision with two at 90 off track on the
same Flight Level (FL) and the third UAV is descending. The risk of collision is detected and
the conflict is resolved. The host UAV platform equipped with ABIA/SAA is able to generate
an avoidance trajectory, which is free from CIF/WIF occurrences. As depicted in Fig. 4, the
host UAV SAA avoidance trajectory and the ABIA/SAA avoidance trajectory have a different
rejoin point on the original track. For clarity, three different points are shown on the
ABIA/SAA host platform trajectory.
• SAA Break-off Point: The point where the host UAV initiates the avoidance trajectory
(commanded by the SAA system). The cost function criteria adopted in this case is
minimum time.
• SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point: The point where the host UAV can manoeuvre safely
(any manoeuvre within its operational flight envelope) has 0 ROC. From this point
onwards the SAA cost function criteria switches to minimum time and minimum fuel
to get back on the original (desired) track.
• ABIA Re-join Point: The point where the host UAV re-joins the original (desired)
track without GNSS data degradations.
16th Australian Aerospace Congress, 23-24 February 2015, Melbourne
SAA Break-off Point
SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/DAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 4: 3 UAV (90º and descent) collision cooperative SAA scenario
The horizontal separation obtained in this case with respect to one of the intruders is shown in
Fig. 5.
Fig. 5: Obtained horizontal separation
Fig. 6 illustrates the N-SAA test scenario where the AEROSONDE UAV (ABIA/SAA host
platform) is flying straight and level while an A320 is in a descending phase.
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 6: UAV 90º collision non-cooperative SAA scenario
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The horizontal separation obtained is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: Obtained horizontal separation
The ABIA IFG module is capable of generating integrity flags to provide both caution and
warning signals when GNSS signals are degraded or lost. After the integrity caution flag is
generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity event is
detected and the warning flag is generated), is at least 2 seconds [2, 3]. This TTC can support
safety-critical tasks including GLS curved/segmented precision approach and automatic
landing applications. In the C-SAA and N-SAA scenarios investigated and in the dynamic
conditions explored, all near mid-air collision threats were successfully avoided by
implementing adequate trajectory optimisation algorithms. The FAR and DR obtained for all
the flight phases of the UAV with an on-board ABIA, GBAS and ABAS are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: FAR and DR
System FAR DR
ABIA 0.164 0.836
GBAS 0.030 0.970
SBAS 0.435 0.545
These results confirm that ABIA contributes to providing an integrity augmented SAA
solution in cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios that is well suited for an extension of
the current GBAS/SBAS augmentation network in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
applications. This provides foundations for the development of a future SGAAN architecture
meeting the requirements for manned and unmanned aircraft separation maintenance and
collision avoidance tasks.
Conclusion
The synergies between a GNSS ABIA system and a novel UAS SAA architecture for
cooperative and non-cooperative applications were explored. The integration of ABIA with
SAA leads to an Integrity Augmented SAA solution, which can potentially support the safe
and unrestricted access of UAS to commercial airspace. The trajectory optimization problem
was tackled using both DG and PS techniques, and the real-time capability of the FPOM was
verified. Simulation case studies were performed for the ABIA IFG module, IFG/FPOM
modules and ABIA/SAA integration. From the results of the simulation activity, the following
conclusions are drawn:
• The ABIA IFG module is capable of generating integrity flags to provide both caution
(predictive) and warning signals to the pilot when GNSS signals are degraded or lost.
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• After the CIF is generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot to react before the
WIF is generated, is sufficient for safety-critical tasks including GLS
curved/segmented approach and automatic landing applications.
• Data analysis shows that the ABIA system can provide the level of integrity required
for CAT-IIIC precision approach, which are currently unavailable with LAAS.
• The ABIA integration into an existing UAV SAA architecture proved that all near
mid-air collision threats were successfully avoided by implementing suitable trajectory
optimisation algorithms.
• The proposed ABIA/SAA integration architecture is capable of achieving adequate
performance by avoiding critical satellite data losses while fulfilling the separation
requirements set for SAA.
Objectives for future work include the investigation and comparison of different types of
avionics sensor technologies and their potential to support the design of robust ABAS/ABIA
architectures for manned aircraft and UAVs. A possible extension of the ABAS/ABIA
concepts to the Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) application domain and investigation of ABIA
Line-of-Sight (LOS) and Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) communication interfaces for UAS
applications is also being considered. Additionally, the ABIA evolutions for Next Generation
Flight Management System (NG-FMS) applications [24-27] including trajectory optimization
for future CNS+A systems, 4D trajectory intent based operations and NG-FMS/ABIA
integration are currently being investigated. Finally, a study of the possible applications of
ABAS/ABIA concepts to advanced mission planning and incident/accident investigation is
being conducted.
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